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Notes
THE UNPOPULAR CRIMINAL DEFENDANT:
HIS RIGHT, LAWYER'S DUTY, WAYS OF ENSURING BOTH
The sixth and the fourteenth amendments guarantee to every man
accused in a criminal prosecution the right "to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defense." The United States Supreme Court, in Gideon
v. Wainwright,' decided unanimously that the right to counsel of one
charged with crime is so fundamental that the prosecution must provide the accused with a lawyer when he cannot afford to retain one.
Then followed Escobedo v. Illinois2 which projected the right to counsel even into the police station under certain circumstances. The
federal constitution, the state constitutions, in all but one state, and
the decisions of the Supreme Court spell out definitively the right to
the assistance of counsel.3
Moreover, individual lawyers of seventeen states,4 including
Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi, upon admission to the bar swear,
'I will never reject, from any consideration personal to myself, the
cause of the defenseless or oppressed." 5 A report of the American Bar
Association Special Committee on Individual Rights as Affected by
National Security states: "American Lawyers generally recognize that
it is the duty of the Bar to see that all defendants, however unpopular,
have the benefit of counsel for their defense." 6
Yet despite the almost unanimous acceptance of the duty to
represent all criminal defendants, which perforce includes unpopular
defendants,7 many, perhaps most, lawyers today fail to discharge this
responsibility when unpopular defendants are involved.
During the McCarthy era, Supreme Court Justice William 0.
Douglas described the difficulties faced by unpopular defendants in
obtaining counsel in these words, "Fear even strikes at lawyers and
1872 U.S. 835 (1963).

2378 U.S. 478 (1964).

3 See Beaney, The Right to Counsel in American Court (1955)

for a

complete account of the historical background of the sixth amendment provision.
4 Ala., Calif., Ga., Idaho, Ind., Iowa, Minn., Miss., Neb., N.Y., N.D., Ore.,
Okla., S. D., Utah, Wash., Wisc.; Cheatham, Cases and Materials on the Legal
Profession 557 (1955).
56 Oath of Admission to the Bar commended by the American Bar Association.
Report, The Independence of the Bar, 13 Law Guild Rev. 158 (1953).
7 "Unpopular" defendants as used here is defined as anyone whose conduct
offends the religious, social or political mores of a community; e.g., a Negro
asserting his civil rights in the South, or a draft-card burner.
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the Bar. Those accused of illegal Communist activity-all presumed
innocent, of course, until found guilty-have difficulty getting reputable
lawyers to defend them.... This is a dark tragedy.""
Today, the civil rights era, the battle rages on. Only the battlefront has changed. Rostow, Dean of Yale Law School, focused attention on this situation when he asserted:
Complaints have come from different areas where accused persons have
been deprived of right to counsel because of the refusal of the members
of the bar to represent discredited defendants or become involved in
unpopular cases. Throughout the year, and particularly in recent weeks,
instances have been reported ... that persons under criminal charges
in certain sections of the South have been deprived of their right to
effective counsel because of the refusal of lawyers of the Caucasian race
to appear in the defense of colored defendants; and a late request has
come to the Committee that it assist in providing counsel to represent socalled "freedom riders" when they are arrested in the South and cannot
obtain the service of local white lawyers to defend them. 9

In support of Dean Rostow's appraisal, Jack Greenberg, director
and counsel of the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Education Fund,
speaking to the Harvard Student Bar Association commented that it
was "almost impossible to get a white man to bring a school desegregation suit."10 It is apparent, therefore, this "dark tragedy" still persists.
Regrettably, this fact is understandable, although not justifiable,
in that attorneys who undertake to fly in the face of public opinion by
representing the unpopular are subjected to personal vilification, loss
of practice, social reprisals from friends both within and without the
bar, and political disabilities. 1' In addition, there are cases where
lawyers who have counseled unpopular persons have faced contempt
citations and disbarment proceedings.' 2 Some lawyers have even been
abused by the bench itself. Lawyers counselling negroes in civil rights
cases inMississippi have not been afforded the usual considerations
13
by the court.
This then is the problem. Our adversary system, fraught with
technical legal rules, is such that a fair trial requires effective legal
S Douglas, The Black Silence of Fear, New York Times Magazine, Jan. 13,
1952, p. 1.
9 Rostow, The Lawyer and His Client, 48 A.B.A.J. 146 (1962).
10 Alexander, The Right to Counsel for the Politically Unpopular, 22 Law
in Transition 19, 45, fn. 64 (1963).
11 Id. at 28-42.
121n re Schlesinger, 404 Pa. 584, 172 A.2d 835 (1961); Schlesinger V. Musmanno, 367 Pa. 476, 81 A.2d 316 (1951). Sacher v. Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, 347 U.S. 388 (1954) (per curiam); In re Disbarment of Isserman, 345 U.S. 286 (1953), order set aside, 348 U.S. 1 (1954); Sacher v.
United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952).
13 New York Times, October 30, 1961, p. 14 col. 4.

KE

~cy

LAw JouRNAL

[Vol. 54,

representation of criminal defendants. 14 While theoretically representation in criminal trials is guaranteed by the Constitution, the practical
success of our system depends upon the willingness of lawyers to
represent these defendants. And presently, the attorney who endeavors to counsel an unpopular defendant must bear repressive
social, economic, professional and political pressures and, as a consequence, is loathe to perform his professional duty.
A solution must be directed toward eliminating both the cause
and the effect of the problem. Ameliorating the cause-adverse public
opinion, and reducing the effects-failure of the legal profession in
general, and the individual attorney in particular, to fulfill their
professional duty to counsel the unpopular, is the ambitious goal of
this writing.15
Today's American society, the product of an economic and social
leveling, has generated the mass personality which requires its members to conform. Thus society, including the intelligentsia, has little
tolerance for the social, moral, or political deviate, and this intolerance
manifests itself, in part at least, in the pressures bearing on one who
counsels such an individual. While it is regrettable that society through
its oppressive pressures seemingly fails to apprehend that one of the
cornerstones of democracy and liberty is a fair trial for all and that
there can be no fair trial without the aid of counsel, it is inexcusable
that society stands ready to impute to the lawyer the misdeeds of his
client.
Nobody would identify a doctor who treated Eugene Dennis for heart
trouble as being sympathetic to Marxism. Nobody would criticize a
clergyman because he gave counsel to the worst sinner.
But when a lawyer gives his counsel to someone who has won the
condemnation of society, people point and say what a shocking thing
that this lawyer should be giving his counsel and services to this man
who is so scorned and degraded.16

Consequently, it is imperative that society be conditioned to reject
these attitudes. Experience indicates that society's attitude as it relates
to everything from politics to hairdressing can be molded and remolded by carefully chosen words and actions. It is submitted that
words and actions calculated and properly directed can overcome the
forces that challenge the lawyer as he rises to defend the unpopular.
The public can be made to realize that it is in their best interest, as
14 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
15 See, Downs and Goldman, The Obligation of Lawyers to Represent Un-

popular Defendants, 9 How. L.J. 49 (1963) for a comprehensive survey of the
problem coupled with concrete proposals for its solution.
16 New York Times, September 25, 1960, p. 54, col. 6.
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a people enamored of liberty, to preserve the right to counsel for all
criminal defendants and that a lawyer, like a doctor or clergyman, has
a professional duty arising out of the very nature of our jurisprudential
system to counsel the unpopular defendant in a criminal case regardless of what he may personally think of him.
Community leaders, elementary and secondary educators in social
studies, and social scientists-all in a good position to do so-should
spearhead a drive to educate the public. For example, a high school
social studies teacher could develop an interesting curriculum underscoring the necessity of the right to counsel for all criminal defendants.
The efficacy of this proposal has been recognized by the Civil Liberties
Educational Foundation, Inc., which has drafted a program for the
improvement of secondary school curriculums dealing with civil
liberties. 17
Public instruction through a judicious use of press, radio and
television would doubtless be the most effective device that could
be employed. Announcements, interviews, documentaries and panel
discussions on the meaning and function of the right to counsel are
examples. These communications should emphasize that, as Sir Hartley
Shawcross has put it, "the advocate is not to be identified with his
client. He is the representative but not the alter ego."' 8 This mass
media instruction could be jointly financed by the local chambers of
commerce and the local bar associations. Hopefully, the radio and
television media would cushion the financial burden by featuring
these as public service announcements and the press would donate
newspaper space as a public service.
The soundness of this proposal rests with the fact that it would
not only benefit the individual attorney by freeing him from the
oppressions of adverse public opinion, but it also would endow the
public with a better understanding of our legal system and the legal
profession-an understanding which inescapably would aid in restoring
the profession to its former status as an honorable and noble one.
The American Bar Association, of course, should serve instrumentally in complementing the efforts of the local bar associations
and community leaders in this public education project. The A.B.A.
evidenced an awareness of this need in 1962 when it created a special
fund for public education.' 9 But three years have elapsed and its
influence has been minimal at best. Certainly the American Bar
Association's efforts must be intensified. It is suggested that a more
17

New York Times, November 19, 1962, p. 1, col. 8.

ISPomeroy, A Practitioner'sView, 20 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 741, 744 (1959).
19 American Bar News, (January 15, 1962).
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effective use of this fund would be to make these resources available
to those local bar associations and chambers of commerce that have
demonstrated their willingness to take the initiative in this public
education program. Also, the fund's resources could be employed in
developing an appealing and informative teaching aid which could be
used in elementary and secondary social study courses. To be sure,
the American Bar Association should wisely employ the use of the mass
media in a manner comparable to that which was previously commended. Presumably the fund could be made adequate to underwrite these endeavors.
Public education is but one facet of the organized bar's20 obligation
in this matter. Clearly it must also impress upon its members the
need to remove any stigma which they themselves have attributed to
lawyers who represent unpopular clients, and, affirmatively to publicly
extol the virtue of their colleagues who do counsel the unpopular.
This would do much to erode the false concept of "guilt by association"
and presumably in its place would grow an understanding of the
professional, as opposed to the personal nature of such representation.
Efforts have already been undertaken by the American Bar
Association and the Bar Associations of Maryland and the City of New
York, which have publicly pledged their support to lawyers who undertake the defense of unpopular persons. It is hoped that similar pledges
become widespread to the extent that every member of the Bar
subscribes to them.
Additionally, bar associations should institute plans similar to what
Goodrich has called the "Philadelphia Plan," whereby the local bar
and prominent law firms cooperate by lending both their professional
services and their prestige to the defense of the unpopular. The
Philadelphia Bar Association appoints counsel from among its most
prominent members to represent the unpopular, whereupon the larger
law firms voluntarily assign various of their younger associates on a
rotation basis to assist. As a result, a desirable balance between young
men and experienced men is achieved. 21 Moreover, the esteem of the
prominent lawyers and the large law firm does much to eradicate the
scorn ascribed to lawyers who counsel the unpopular, thus encouraging
the average attorney to participate in this kind of litigation.
As an aside, it would appear essential that every bar association,
preliminary to its other efforts with respect to the unpopular, admit to
its ranks bona-fide attorneys who have previously been excluded solely
20

"Organized bar" includes both the American Bar Association and the
local bar associations.
21 Goodrich, The PhiladelphiaPlan, 20 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 733 (1959).
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because they were socially unpopular. Segregated southern bar
associations are intolerable unless hypocrisy is to be their watchword.
An extremely forceful weapon, and one urged by Dean Rostow
with precedent to support him, is for the bar associations to appear
as amicus curiae or as counsel of record.22 The merit of this suggestion
rests with the prospect that it marshalls the full weight of the bar's
prestige in the struggle to preserve the right ot counsel for even the
most unpopular.
In addition, the organized bar should persuade schools of journalism that during the course of a student journalist's training he should
be alerted to the need for counsel in a criminal trial and to the professional duty of lawyers to satisfy this need. For the practicing
journalist, the organized bar should institute lawyer-journalist conferences which would provide the necessary vehicle through which
the journalist could acquire a greater understanding of legal procedure.
Hopefully these measures would encourage the press, when reporting
a case involving an unpopular person, to temper their sensationalism
with a cautionary remark regarding the lawyer's professional duty to
counsel as well as the right of even the most unpopular to such
assistance. It is also hoped these measures would encourage the
writing of timely newspaper editorials on the subject.
Perhaps the most effective tool to ensure the right to counsel for
the unpopular would be for the American Bar Association to eliminate
some of the disparity between the English and American ethical
standards. Under the present English system, it is considered a breach
of professional etiquette to refuse to counsel a defendant on any
ground other than lack of available time.23 Yet, the American practitioner pursuant to canon 3124 apparently is at liberty to select his
clients at will. The canon reads as follows:
No lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person
who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment. Every lawyer upon his own responsibility must decide what
employment he will accept as counsel, what causes he will bring into
Court for plaintiffs, what causes he will contest in Court for defendants.

It is submitted that canon 31 should be revised. The revision should
allow for a dichotomy between criminal and civil cases. Concerning
the latter, the present discretionary language of the canon should be
preserved; however, with regard to criminal defendants seeking counsel, the canon should be couched in mandatory terms allowing an
2

"Rostow, supra note 9, at 150.
Stryker, The Art of Advocacy 274-75 (1954).
4American Bar Association Canons of Professional Ethics (1957 ed.).

23
2
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attorney to decline representation only when in good faith he does
not have the available time. Realistically, although unlike the British
etiquette, an attorney also should be ethically at liberty to decline
representation when the criminal defendant, not court assigned due to
indigence, has not proffered a reasonable fee.
The American Bar Association could ensure that this proposed
amendment upon adoption receives widespread publicity. This would
have the double-barrelled effect of alerting both attorneys and the
public to this newly ordained ethical duty, which in turn should help
allay any future lay or professional criticism of any attorney appearing
in an unpopular cause.
Legal education must also play a significant role in solving the
problem of obtaining counsel for the unpopular. It is submitted that
law schools have been remiss in this area. They have not and do not
employ sufficient care in admitting students, and once the student has
been admitted, law schools express little or no concern for the needs
of the unpopular client and place little or no emphasis on the
professional duty of lawyers to satisfy this need.
In the main, law schools train employees not professional people.
An educated guess is that nearly fifty per cent of the people admitted
to the law schools have neither the desire nor the capacity to look
beyond the fee part of the profession. This lamentable fact is abetted
by the requirements for admission-intellect plus no criminal record.
No attempt whatever is made to determine an applicant's potential
as a professional person. Of course, no instrument to date has been
devised to make conclusive determinations along these lines, but
certainly, as industry has discovered, there are tests available of
sufficient value to furnish guidelines as to one's suitability for a particular task. Since it is clear that brain alone is not the full measure of
what it takes to be a creditable lawyer, it is submitted that an applicant's undergraduate record need not be augmented by another
brain-testing device, such as the Law School Admissions Test, but
instead, tests revealing the psychological and philosophical "inner
self" seem desirable. Also, personal interviews prior to admission
could be a valuable aid in determining whether the applicant has
sufficient character to discharge his professional responsibilities-one
of which is the duty to counsel the unpopular.
Furthermore, after admission, law students should find themselves
exposed to curricula focusing ample attention on such areas as
individual rights and professional responsibilities. Some courses or
seminars dealing with these topics should be offered. The American
Bar Association's National Council on Legal Clinics recently produced
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a motion picture entitled "Defending the Unpopular Client" This
audio-visual aid and others like it could be put to good use in legal
ethics and legal profession courses. Perhaps the most dramatic
method of impressing upon the student lawyer his professional duty
to counsel the unpopular, as well as the indigent, would be for law
schools more actively to promote participation in the local legal aid
25
and defenders groups.
Not until law schools begin to conscientiously inculcate their
graduates with a sense of professional responsibility, not the least of
which is the duty to counsel the unpopular, can the legal profession
hope to be supplied with those who will do it credit.
It is frustratingly clear that, even should all the foregoing proposals be effectuated, the basic problem would still remain. It is the
individual lawyer who must ultimately make the decision whether or
not to abide by his professional and ethical responsibility. For the
necessary courage and strength to do so, an attorney must look into
his own soul. But while looking he would be well advised to ponder
the words of Justice Louis Brandeis, vho, when asked by a colleague
whether he should refuse a retainer from an extremely unpopular
person, replied: "Before you reject this cause, I suggest you consider
resigning from the Bar. On further consideration, you might even
resign from the human race."2 6
Laurence W. Grause
25 See generally,

Stevens, Legal Education for Practice: What the Law

Schools Can Do and Are Doing, 40 A.B.A.J. 211 (1954).
26, Ernst and Schwartz, The Right to Counsel and the "Unpopular Cause,"
20 U. Pitt L. Rev. 727, 781 (1959).

